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Abstract
This article presents ethnographic material from contemporary Kerala, 
where recent shifts in Muslim women’s dress styles (shift from sari 
towards salwaar kameez; adoption of pardah; use of Arabic abaya) 
have come under critique. We show that commentators fail to take into 
account the degree to which all Indian women—not simply Muslims—
are heavily constrained in dress by issues of modesty and “decency.” 
Dress codes for all communities and both sexes have been continually 
reworked since the nineteenth century. Muslims’ recent changes are 
prompted by a shift away from Hindu idioms and towards more Islamic 
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idioms of modesty; changes index Indian Muslims’ growing realization 
(also apparent in other spheres) that much of India’s putatively common 
culture is actually rooted in Hindu practice. We also show that while 
popular and ethnographic focus alike falls upon women, men are also 
deeply caught up in respecting dress codes. But concerns with decency 
are always negotiated within desires for fashion. Kerala’s Muslim 
community is more than averagely high spending and Muslims are 
especially interested in dressing well and participating in worlds of 
fashion, which may be vernacular ishtyle (Indian ﬁlm driven) or global 
(brands).
KEYWORDS: India, dress, Muslim, Gulf, pardah
While most discussions of veiling tend to compare “Muslim” and 
“Western” styles,1 in India it is Hindus who form the dominant 
majority community against whom Muslims are compared. Dress 
in India is produced, performed, and read through an opposition 
between the putatively “Indian” and the “Western,” but is at the 
same time powerfully shaped by the opposition between “Hindu” and 
“Muslim.” In the southern state of Kerala discussed here, the picture 
is even more complex, partly because of south Indians’ pride in their 
social conservatism (“tradition”) but also because Kerala contains a 
signiﬁcant, wealthy, and powerful Christian minority. Self-consciously 
oriented towards “the West” and to a “modern” aesthetic, Christians 
act as innovators in Kerala’s public sphere, introducing styles of 
dress that would otherwise be less widespread. Issues of “decency” 
and “modesty,” “fashion” and “backwardness” are openly debated 
and contested in Kerala’s multi-community public sphere. Debates 
have become particularly heated since the 1990s, when many south 
Indian Muslim women (like their Sri Lankan neighbors) have taken to 
wearing what is locally known as pardah2 or “decent” dress, a form of 
contemporary veiling linked to pan-Islamic trends, which leaves only 
the hands, feet, and face uncovered (see Milli Gazette 2004; cf. Tarlo 
n.d.).3
Discussions of dress—both popular and academic—commonly focus 
on Muslim women. However, issues of decency in dress also preoccupy 
Muslim men as well as south Indian women from non-Muslim 
backgrounds. This article is based on two years’ recent ﬁeldwork in 
Kozhikode, a northern Kerala (Malabar) mixed but Muslim-dominated 
area. Our analysis is also informed by insights from earlier periods of 
ﬁeldwork in a Hindu-dominated region of central Kerala (Travancore), 
which has a negligible Muslim population.
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Kozhikode: A Cosmopolitan City
With a population of roughly 500,000, Kozhikode4 is the third 
largest city in Kerala. It has a rich and complex history of maritime 
trade dating back to the tenth century, and by the twelfth century 
had become a commercial hub between West Asia, Southeast Asia, 
and South Asia. It also has long-standing trading links with the Arab 
world, which continued right up to the 1970s. More recently, since the 
1980s, Kozhikode’s economy has become dependent upon revenues and 
remittances from Gulf migration. This diverse history contributes to the 
city’s popular reputation for “cosmopolitanism.” As a result, for local 
Muslims, dress objectiﬁes the triple-strandedness of a highly speciﬁc 
self: south Indian Malayali, pan-Islamic, and Arab-connected. At times 
these orientations are in tension, as when claims for a speciﬁcally south 
Indian aesthetic pull against recent reformist imperatives towards 
pardah for women. While it is often noted that women are the cultural 
and symbolic bearers of community identity (Nelson 1999; Tarlo 1996; 
Yuval-Davis 1997), it should be pointed out that men’s bodies are also, 
albeit more subtly, marked as Muslim, something widely overlooked in 
popular and academic literature alike. 
Kerala Dress Styles
Kerala prides itself upon being a relatively secular state, not prone 
to the extremes of communal disturbance or religious chauvinism 
found in north India. In the Indian context, secularism is deﬁned as 
the constitutional guarantee of equal respect for all religions, even if 
this is not always upheld. In Kerala, as elsewhere in India, dress codes 
increasingly mark out the religious identities of the different groups 
living within a plural state. 
To some extent it is possible to plot the geography of dress in Kerala 
according to the densities of different religious groups in different areas. 
Kozhikode is considered a conservative town because of the strong 
Muslim presence in contrast to Ernakulam, a city with a Christian 
majority where dress codes are more permissive. There, fashion items 
such as jeans or sleeveless T-shirts (for women) and Bermuda shorts (for 
young men) are a common sight. Such items are rarely seen outside of 
this Christian-dominated city and are considered inappropriate dress by 
all Muslims and by many Hindus. In Thiruvananthapuram (formerly 
Trivandrum) city to the south, where the Hindu inﬂuence is strong, 
gold-bordered cream handloom cloth known as cassava is frequently 
spotted, worn both as a female sari or male mundu (waist-cloth).
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Women’s Dress
Known as Westerns across India, European-style skirts, trousers, T-
shirts, and so on have made hardly any inroads into Kerala. Young 
unmarried women up to around the age of twenty who come from very 
progressive families may wear these items for college or socializing. Such 
girls are most likely to be urban, middle-class, and from the Christian 
community or from the long-standing immigrant Gujarati Hindu 
community. But for any family, formal or even semi-formal occasions 
Westerns would not be considered appropriate. In line with wider south 
Indian currents, and in contrast to much of Southeast Asia or even 
neighboring Sri Lanka, Westerns carry the slight smack of license and 
immodesty. 
Over the twentieth century, the sari has gradually replaced various 
regional dresses to become a quintessential pan-south Asian female 
garment (Banerjee and Miller 2003). Worn from about seventeen-years-
old onwards, it is in this area a six-meter piece of fabric draped over 
a ﬂoor-length underskirt and blouse.5 However, there are considerable 
divergences of style. Hindu and Christian women leave the sari end 
(pallu) draped over one shoulder. Some Muslim women still use the 
sari end to cover their heads, but more often nowadays women are 
matching the sari with a separately bought mafta—a headscarf of 
chiffon or polyester in a complementing shade and pattern. Underneath 
the sari, Christian and Hindu women wear short blouses (leaving the 
midriff exposed) and short, tight sleeves—and often implore tailors to 
make the blouse sleeves as tight as possible. The tight sleeves relate both 
to ideals of attractiveness—one wants to show off plump and shapely 
upper arms—but also, to different idioms of modesty. Sleeveless tops 
are widely considered immodest in Kerala and not much used outside of 
very sophisticated urban upper-middle-class circles. For Hindu women, 
modesty is about wrapping, restraining, and binding: clothes are tight, 
wound around the body, and jewelry such as anklets and bangles 
contain the bodily extremities. There is an emphasis on binding, sealing, 
and restraining (see Fruzzetti 1981: 16; Shulman 1980). Young Hindu 
girls and women wear a waist-chain, unlike boys, who need to wear 
these constraining, protecting, binding items only until toddlerhood 
is over; older married women wear bangles and necklaces. Bangles, 
waist-chains, anklets, and so on are speciﬁcally feminine adornments 
associated with ideas about female vulnerability, permeability, and need 
for protection and containment of feminine power (Fruzzetti 1982; 
Marglin 1985; Tapper 1979).
While Muslim girls also use waist-chains, anklets, and so on, recently 
a different logic of modesty and protection has become visible. The idea 
of female vulnerability being best protected by binding and wrapping 
is being supplanted by more orthodox Islamic idioms of modesty and 
protection. Here, tight clothing is seen as no longer appropriate. Muslim 
women now refuse to wear the short-sleeved midriff-revealing sari 
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blouse that was common right up until the late 1980s, and instead now 
match their saris with a long-sleeved, loose, long, and fully lined blouse, 
so that the body shape is not revealed. This makes the matching blouse 
pieces that are sold with saris useless to Muslim women, as the piece 
(less than one meter) is never big enough to make up a blouse in this 
long and loose style. Muslim women resort to non-matching blouses or 
to clever tailoring which adds sections in and keeps the “matching” part 
for a sleeve trim at the wrist (Figure 1). 
This simple ethnographic point exempliﬁes a wider issue: the degree to 
which things long heralded as “Indian” in fact turn out to be structured 
by the needs and values of dominant high-caste Hindu communities 
(in the Kerala case, the Nayars). Kerala’s famous cassava dressu is a 
prime example. Whenever one speaks of “Kerala dress,” when state 
institutions such as banks hold “national dress days,” when there is a 
cultural program, tourist brochure or indeed anything purporting to 
showcase Kerala’s regional speciﬁcity, women will be shown wearing 
short, tight red sari blouses under the cream and gold-bordered 
handloom sari (the cassava), which is instantly recognizable throughout 
India as coming from Kerala. The bright red blouse (a color auspicious 
to Hindu women) is matched with a large red pottu or bindi (forehead 
spot), and jasmine garlands adorn loose hair. This “Kerala traditional 
dress” was actually invented and adopted in the nineteenth century 
by high-caste Hindu women. It is nowadays adopted by lower-caste 
and Christian women alike as emblematic of regional afﬁliation but is 
almost never worn by Muslims. Furthermore, using a pottu or bindi 
Figure 1 
A reformist organization’s 
cookery contest entrants 
wearing pardah or long and 
loose salwaar kameezes 
carefully teamed with matching 
mafta (headscarves). The 
contest judges who are elite 
Muslim women from outside 
the area are wearing costly silk 
saris and using the tail to cover 
their hair. Photograph: Caroline 
Osella.
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(even a fashionable adhesive decorative one) which signiﬁes feminine 
auspiciousness, is considered inappropriate for Muslim women, as is 
wearing hair loose and adorned with ﬂowers. What is dubbed “Indian” 
or “Malayali” turns out to be high-caste Hindu and ultimately excludes 
Muslims (cf. Simpson 2004). 
Difference is also evident in Hindu attitudes towards the salwaar 
kameez (Figure 2), the long tunic worn over loose pants and matched 
Figure 2 
Girl wearing the school 
uniform of salwaar kameez. 
Photograph: Matthea de Jong.
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with a shawl, which has become the Kerala unmarried girl’s dress since 
the 1990s. Hindu villagers were initially very hostile to replacing their 
half-sari or pavada-blouse (skirt-blouse plus breast-wrap) with the 
salwaar kameez, commonly (although incorrectly) known throughout 
Kerala as the churidar (a usage followed here). It is perhaps an index 
of these garments’ perceived exotic foreignness that consumers and 
even shopkeepers in Kerala are unclear about terms. In north India 
and Pakistan, where the dress originates, the basic style of long tunic 
and loose pants is known as salwaar kameez (women) or kurta-pajama 
(men’s version), or sometimes “Punjabi suit/suit.” This terminology is 
not heard in Kerala. In north India, churidar refers speciﬁcally to a style 
in which the pants are very tight around the leg, showing the calf outline, 
but in Kerala, the term churidar has been adopted to refer to any form 
or design of women’s salwaar kameez. The churidar is often scornfully 
referred to as “Muslim dress” or even “Pakistani dress” by older Hindu 
men. Young Hindu and Christian women receive complaints from elders 
when they venture out in the churidar. The use of pants rather than a 
skirt was thought unseemly. “What are these legs?” one grandfather 
roared. Still now, the churidar among Hindus is thought of mostly as an 
unmarried woman’s outﬁt, and only the most modern married women 
will use it. For formal wear, a sari is considered essential. 
By contrast, it was pleasure rather than hostility that greeted the 
churidar’s arrival on the fashion scene among Muslims in the late 
1980s. Here was a dress for teenage girls and young women that, unlike 
pavada and blouse, did not accentuate and reveal the body’s shape, but 
was loose. Moreover, while the blouse could ride up from pavada and 
reveal a strip of midriff, with the churidar, the body is decently covered 
from neck to ankle with no threat of exposure. The churidar is widely 
preferred in daily use and even at parties and pre-wedding functions. 
Saris are brought out by married women for weddings, but on no 
other occasions are they considered compulsory. Specially elaborate 
churidars are considered suitable as formal wear by young Muslim 
married women and mothers, a group that among Hindus would clearly 
be expected to don saris. The churidar has then been enthusiastically 
adopted and holds a respectability among Muslim women that it does 
not have among Hindus. 
Styles of churidar vary by community (to the extent that one can often 
easily guess a woman’s religion and ethnicity from her churidar alone). 
This is the main reason why Kerala women still vastly prefer fabric 
pieces for stitching over ready-made clothes. Hindus and Christians use 
short, tight sleeves and have the top tailored to a body-ﬁtting shape. By 
contrast, Muslim churidars should be long, the tunic well down to the 
mid-calf, loose, with full or at least three-quarter sleeves, with baggy 
pants, lined to prevent any transparency or cling that might reveal a 
woman’s body-shape or allow her brassiere strap to be discernable 
from behind. Even opaque fabrics like silk are lined to prevent cling. 
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Interestingly, bare arms are a greater source of anxiety and policing than 
bare heads. While all Muslim women keep well covered outside of the 
home, inside they often go with no head covering, although they never 
go sleeveless even in the bedroom. 
Another aspect of the Muslim churidar is that the neckline is always 
covered by the mafta headscarf. Even when women remove outer pardah 
dress in women’s rooms at functions, they keep the mafta headscarf 
on. So while Hindu women often favor designs around the neckline of 
a churidar, Muslim women prefer designs on the bottom hem, where 
they can be admired. The preponderance of neckline designs in churidar 
piece shops is another example of how fashion is majority-driven and 
is another motivation for many Muslim women to learn to sew and 
embroider for themselves. 
Wholesalers and retailers all agreed in interviews that fashion in 
Kozhikode—as elsewhere in India—is heavily inﬂuenced by the movies. 
Each new ﬁlm introduces a new style, color, and pattern, and this is then 
adopted two or three months after the ﬁlm’s release. While there are clear 
fashion seasons when new styles come in and when everyone buys new 
clothes such as the two Eids, the summer hot season and the rainy season, 
movie-related fashion trends appear all year-round, and businesses keep 
up with them. As Tarlo notes, since economic liberalization, fashion 
seems to have speeded up, with new styles appearing continually (1996: 
337). At Eid 2003, Jamilla, a twenty-nine-year-old married woman 
with two children, and a migrant husband in Saudi, appeared wearing 
a salwaar with ﬂared sleeves and loose parallel pants. She told us that 
the next fashion just coming in would be “jubba style”—loose, with 
very long and loose sleeves. “This will be comfortable,” she remarked; 
“you’ll still get the breeze to your arms, like this one I’m wearing now. 
But this ﬂared sleeve is not good; when you pray, you need you arms 
covered totally, and this ﬂared sleeve slips up. A long jubbah sleeve will 
be better.” The fast and cheap churidar piece market enables women to 
negotiate the demands of modesty with the desire for fashion.
Speciﬁcity of Muslim Dress
It is often claimed that even ﬁfteen years ago, pardah was not in use 
amongst Muslims in South India. It is said that Muslim women even 
wore their saris with tight, midriff-revealing short-sleeved blouses, like 
their Hindu counterparts. The post-1980s take up of pardah has been 
heavily criticized by non-Muslims as a foreign, not local (nadan) custom 
and an unwelcome innovation attributed to Arab inﬂuence via the Gulf. 
Post-reform changes in dress appear to provoke extreme anxiety, if not 
resentment, among non-Muslims. Hindu men complain that it is unfair 
that Muslim men can see Hindu women’s bodies while non-Muslims 
are denied the pleasure of seeing Muslim women’s bodies. However, in 
reality, a white pardah dress was in use up until the 1960s, while many 
older Muslim women can still be seen wearing the old-fashioned style 
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Indian burqa (cf. Jeffery 1979). Clearly, what has actually happened is 
that a lapse in veiling from the 1960s to 1980s has been followed by 
reveiling or, as commentators have speciﬁed in other contexts, a new 
veiling (El-Guindi 1999). The “newness” has two aspects: ﬁrst, the 
styles now in use are quite different from the old tent-like white pardah 
or black burqa, and secondly, contemporary veiling is indicative of a 
more developed consciousness towards Islam and is linked to global 
styles of Islamic “decent dress” in which only the face, hands, and feet 
are revealed (cf. Tarlo n.d.; Brenner 1996). At the same time, what is 
interesting in Kozhikode is that, in contrast to what is often reported 
in other ethnographic locales, wearing pardah is neither a one-off 
move, nor necessarily indicative of the weighty ideological decision it 
appears to represent in Java (Brenner 1996), Egypt (Mahmood 2005), 
Bangladesh (Huq 2008) and the UK (Tarlo n.d.). Many women who 
sometimes wear pardah (for example, if going to the bazaar) do not 
necessarily wear it at other times, for example when just going one 
street away from home to a ladies’ sewing class. This is similar to the 
situational veiling described by Stimpful (2000: 176) and Shirazi (2000) 
among Singapore Malay and Iranian migrant women, respectively.
Kerala Islamic reformism, represented by organizations such as the 
Kerala Naduvathul Mujahideen (KNM, founded 1952), has combined 
calls for the adoption of an orthopraxy based on a textual adherence to 
the Koran with a commitment to an overall modernization of community 
practices. Critical commentators like to “blame” reformist organizations 
like Jamaat-i-Islamiya or KNM for promoting pardah. Such criticisms 
need to be put into context against arguments commonly made by 
Muslims themselves that an increased awareness of and adherence to the 
requirements of piety is a natural progression towards self-perfection, 
a trajectory that has speeded up in Kerala since the translation of the 
Koran into Araby-Malayalam (Malayalam language written in Arabic 
script) in 1853 and into the vernacular in 1961. From this perspective, 
the appearance of the KNM (mujahid) reform movement in 1952 is a 
result and not a cause of increased Islamic awareness (Mahmood 2005; 
Metcalf 1992). Critics also accuse the Muslim community of “turning in 
on itself.” Here, they fail to put Islamic reform into perspective against 
the degree to which modernity and literacy in Kerala have prompted 
all communities, not only Muslims, into reﬂexive processes of reform. 
Non-Muslims also generally fail to appreciate the fact that the imagined 
secular public sphere in Kerala (as in India more widely) is actually—
albeit sometimes quite subtly—nuanced as “Hindu,” a phenomenon 
sometimes referred to as “banal Hinduism” (Jeffery et al. 2006).
Muslims attribute their use of pardah to two main currents: a 
heightened sense of what is right and moral, prompted by social reform 
movements such as KNM; and a growing sense of marginalization and 
insecurity as a minority community. India has, in the last two decades, 
witnessed an oppressive climate of Hindutva (Hindu chauvinistic 
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nationalism), which has undoubtedly prompted greater attachment to 
an Islamic identity amongst Muslims.6
It is notable that Muslim women also talk of convenience: they often 
go out of the house, and sometimes into town, wearing only a maxi 
(house-dress) and pardah. This is much easier than putting on a sari or 
churidar. “You put the pardah on top and—there! You are ready to go! 
No need to dress!” they said, a point conceded even by critics of pardah 
(see e.g. Basheer 2003).
While many working-class and lower-middle-class women buy black 
or dark cloth (most commonly green, blue, brown, maroon) and stitch 
their own pardah, since the early 1990s pardah has been industrially 
manufactured in Kerala. There are innumerable small producers and 
two major manufacturers that advertise in the regional press, on 
billboards and television and have outlets across Kerala: Hoorulyn and 
Lamia (Figure 3). According to De Jong, who undertook interviews 
with managing directors of both companies, Hoorulyn has increased 
its sales since its inception in 1992 from 100 dresses to 10,000 by 2002 
(2005). The commonest “local style” pardah dress consists of a ﬂoor-
length coat made of soft or more durable cotton or polyester (depending 
on the budget) with tight sleeves and a little discreet embroidery or 
decoration on the cuff and down the front. It is matched with a mafta—
for daily use, usually a plain black or cream cotton headscarf. As with 
churidars, pardah and headscarf is a negotiated dress that seeks to 
maximize modesty while not ignoring fashion and glamour. Maftas 
range from simple coarse cotton among working-class women to more 
glamorous and expensive soft fabrics for party wear, chosen carefully to 
match the churidar. Fancy scarves in shiny fabrics or with brand names 
are particularly desirable, as are scarves of obvious foreign origin. But 
Figure 3 
Advert for Hoorulyn pardah 
dress. Photograph: Matthea 
de Jong. 
 Muslim Style in South India 11
women do not have anything like the range of fashionable scarves 
described in Turkey (Sandıkcı and Ger 2005). 
The recent take-up of the Arabic abaya as a more glamorous and 
costly form of pardah is of course largely attributable to recent Gulf 
migration. Women under thirty tend to prefer this sophisticated garment, 
made of thin black opaque material, and which may have ﬂared sleeves, 
embroidery, silver thread-work or stone-work. Women told us that 
those who are young and slim prefer the more form-ﬁtting abaya, while 
those who are more matronly choose the looser and less conspicuous 
local pardah, and it is certainly true that the abaya is mostly seen on 
the under-thirties. Sometimes the abaya is a locally bought or stitched 
duplicate and sometimes it has been brought by a husband or brother on 
leave from his job in the Gulf. The abaya carries considerable symbolic 
capital, both because it is more costly than local pardah (between 1,000 
and 6,000 rupees as opposed to 200 to 500 rupees7) and because it hints 
at Gulf connections and a standard of living and consumption only 
available to those linked to the migrant remittance economy (Figure 
4). At Kozhikode’s stylish upmarket air-conditioned showroom “House 
of Pardah,” imported abayas were available ranging from 4,000 to 
6,000 rupees with top-quality mafta scarves in good fabrics from 60 to 
120 rupees. In the Gulf the abaya is worn by high-status wealthy Arab 
women, which adds to the garment’s symbolic capital in the Indian 
context (cf. Thangaraj 2004). 
It is important not to confuse the speciﬁc garment—abaya—with 
pardah generally, and to assume that the appearance of the abaya 
means that it is mainly Arab inﬂuences that are bringing pardah into 
Figure 4 
A young fashion-conscious 
mother wears the glamorous 
abaya; her small son is 
dressed in a stylish jubbah top. 
Photograph: Caroline Osella.
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contemporary Kerala. This is the common move made in Kerala public 
discourse, where “Arab inﬂuence” on “our women” is deplored and 
becomes a focus of exaggerated fears. Thangaraj (2004) describes 
similar preoccupations in Sri Lanka, where housemaids return from Gulf 
migration wearing the abaya. Far more Muslim women are wearing 
locally made and designed brands of pardah than are wearing imported 
abayas. The abaya is simply one garment that has been incorporated 
into a local repertoire of contemporary veiling.
Muslim Aesthetics
Muslim women are very fashion conscious; they spend more on clothes 
than other communities and have a taste for expensive churidars. In the 
local bazaar, shopkeepers agreed that the average lower-middle-class 
Hindu woman would have ﬁve or six churidars, with a couple of good 
silk saris for functions. Muslim women may have ten or twelve churidars 
and four or ﬁve saris and the items they choose are typically more 
expensive. These differences do not reﬂect relative community wealth 
but rather a difference in willingness to spend on personal consumption 
items. Muslim women want to wear clothes that look expensive, and 
which objectify their social position as wives and daughters of men in 
the “business class” (even if their husband is actually just a worker in 
a bazaar shop).
One outsider was criticizing the Muslim community, saying, “We 
have social functions all the time also, but we don’t wear something new 
every time; yet they do—how can they afford this?” The answer is that 
Muslim women with menfolk in the clothing trade can afford plenty of 
clothes because they get them free or at wholesale rates. Muslim women 
are also enthusiastic attenders at stitching and embroidery classes. The 
churidar is where Muslim women fully enjoy their penchant for fashion; 
at women-only functions and spaces, women admire each other’s clothes 
and always dress as extravagantly as they can manage (cf. Fugelsang 
1994 for similar ethnography in an African Muslim context ). 
Churidar fabrics arrive mostly from other parts of India. Upmarket 
shops stock a few pieces of foreign material—prestigious and costly, if 
not necessarily better. Mid- and mid-upper-market retailers buy from 
Bombay and Bangalore; bottom-end retailers buy from nearby Tamil 
Nadu and cheap Gujarat. Shops can be tied into the local or the Gulf 
economy, or both. Whereas strictly local shops claim that the monsoon 
is a relatively dead time for business; stylish upmarket shops claim to 
be most busy at this time for this is when Gulf migrant families come 
home on vacation and stock up on new clothes. Upper-middle-class 
Gulf wives on annual vacation will buy up to twenty churidar sets to 
stitch and take back for the year. 
Most Muslim women prefer to shop at the new shopping malls (open-
air multi-story concrete structures) in the bazaar, where shopkeepers 
understand local tastes. Shopkeepers claim that Muslim women are 
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unwilling to spend highly on the quality of the fabric, preferring to place 
emphasis on display and spectacle. Upmarket shopkeepers lamented 
women’s lack of knowledge about quality and their unwillingness to 
spend on it. At the same time, top-end and bottom-end alike capitalize 
on this tendency by selling churidar sets where the ﬂimsiest and cheapest 
of fabrics—polyester and thin cotton—are married with heavy “fancy 
work.” “Work” is highly valorized. The term covers decorations in 
fabric, from hand and machine embroidery to appliqué, beadwork, 
and other forms of embellishment. Special prestige (and cost) attaches 
to styles coming from distant Muslim places, such as Lahore. Various 
grades of synthetics are glamorized with names like summer cool or 
art silk, but shopkeepers conﬁrmed that customers rarely discussed the 
fabric as such. Rather they discussed the color, design, and work.
In Kozhikode Muslims are distinguishable from Hindus and Christians 
by their commitment to cutting-edge fashion, their disdain for “classic” 
and simple cotton ﬂoral prints and their increased fondness for strongly 
colored synthetics and glitzy work. In rural Malappuram such tastes 
are further emphasized by Gulf-rich Muslims who have developed this 
distinctive “Muslim style” even more strongly.
Muslim Men’s Dress
Whilst women’s Muslim identity is increasingly emphasized through 
dress practices, Muslim men’s identity is down played, though not 
entirely invisible. Their adoption of mainstream dress demonstrates 
cultured taste and a modern outlook, which is in stark contrast to 
national stereotypes of Muslims. In popular representations—such as 
school plays or television serials—Muslim men invariably appear as 
rural and uncouth: dressed in an ankle-length checked lungis (rough 
cotton waist-cloths) held up by wide belts, wearing a vest and skullcap 
over a shaven head and a beard and talking in rough Malayalam 
(cf. Ansari 2005). Here, markers of class—the lungi and vest—and 
community—shaven head, skullcap, and beard—are brought together 
to deﬁne Muslims as Kerala’s “backward others.”
While the lungi and vest combination are in fact common everyday 
attire amongst all of Kerala’s rural and urban working class, in 
Kozhikode urban Muslims have long been open to fashion and new 
styles. Pre-Independence photos show urban Muslim men mixing a 
number of styles: wearing white mundus and white shirts; coats (jacket) 
and shoes—symbols of wealth, sophistication, and engagement with 
colonial fashions. The fez, or turkeytopi, along with the valatopi (white 
hat),8 were both high fashion and political statements for young men 
right up until the late 1930s, when they were brieﬂy replaced by the 
Jinnahtopi—the hat worn by Jinnah, the all-India leader of the Muslim 
League pre-Independence.
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With the 1950s popularization of trousers (pants)9 came a split 
in men’s styles, still observable today. Kozhikode bazaar traders and 
government employees continue to wear the mundu, a garment strongly 
coded as “south Indian” and “Keralite.” Gulf migrants always wear 
trousers when away (unlike Pakistani migrants, who are identiﬁable 
in the Gulf by their kurta-pajamas), but on return to Kozhikode they 
revert to the mundu. Politicians or wealthy businessmen also like to 
be seen in public wearing the mundu as a populist move but in many 
contexts they will wear trousers. The mundu/pants divide (as among 
Hindus) is also generational. Those born after the 1980s are unlikely to 
be seen wearing a mundu. Just as Muslim women seem to be shifting 
from the sari towards a wider use of the churidar, even for formal wear, 
young men are abandoning the mundu for pants.
While many Muslim men claim to be visually indistinguishable from 
Christian and Hindu men, speciﬁc mundu-wearing styles mark out 
religious identity in subtle ways. Not only do Muslim men prefer mundu 
borders to be wide and colored (green, brown, and blue borders being 
most popular), but unlike Hindu and Christian men, they never use gold 
(cassava) borders. Moreover, Muslims normally fold the mundu to the 
left, hold it up with a belt, wear it ankle-length and never fold the end 
up to make it knee-length (Figure 5).
For shirts and pants, adult Muslim men go for both ready-made and 
individually tailored garments. In contrast to women who, even at the 
top end of the market, always prefer to buy fabric and have garments 
stitched according to their own preference, men prefer whenever possible 
Figure 5 
Muslim men and women 
separated by a cloth partition. 
The men are wearing either 
mundu (wraps) or trousers with 
their shirts. Photograph: Filippo 
Osella.
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to buy ready-mades. The acceptability of most ready-made designs 
across communities is itself indicative of the lesser differentiation of 
“modern” male dress by community as compared to female dress.
Those men who work outside the bazaar—in professions or business—
use trousers, and tend to follow wider fashion trends; photos from the 
1970s show men wearing wide bell-bottoms, while currently many are 
wearing chinos. Muslim youth styles also seem to follow pan-Kerala 
trends. However, even standard shirts and pants show subtle signs of 
distinction. For example, the shirts and pants preferred by Muslim men 
are relatively sober in design, color, and ﬁt, and are never too tight 
or fashionable. “Decent” Muslim men, whether “traditionalist” or 
committed to reformism, never wear jeans: this is something that marks 
them as clearly different from Hindu and Christian young men, for whom 
jeans are perhaps the most desirable item of clothing. Reformist-minded 
Muslim teenagers dress instead in a “preppy” style, with sober smart 
shirts and chinos, or classic pants. Again, while Hindu men often prefer 
sandals, Muslims commonly match pants with shoes. Most importantly, 
Muslim men do not wear the 22-carat gold jewelry enthusiastically 
worn by men of other communities in Kerala, and which has become 
particularly popular in post-Gulf migration times.
However, some of Kerala’s teenage boys follow high fashion and have 
become known as the freak boys. They wear whatever is the latest, and 
the more outrageous the better: bleached jeans with holes in the knee; 
lurex shirts; shirts which are made to look like fur; impossibly tight 
trousers. While this style is more commonly associated with lower-class 
Muslim boys from the ﬁshing, laboring, and servant communities along 
the beach-side, freak style is also a sign of lesser commitment to the 
reformist wave of discreet and decent dress and, indeed, to the idea of 
dress restrictions as an aspect of one’s Muslim identity. Freak boys will 
certainly wear jeans.
As among women, commitment to religious reformism and decent 
dress in no way implies a lack of interest in fashion. The distinction 
between preppy (respectable) chinos and freak style is indicative of 
what Sanjay Srivastava describes as the difference in India between 
middle-class fashion, tied into global trends and working-class ishtyle, a 
more vernacular fashion that draws strongly on Hindi ﬁlms (Srivastava 
2007), such as the Tamil movie Boys, or the Malayalam movie 4 
the People. Another source of male fashion is the “silicon city” of 
Bangalore, home to software industries and global styles, where many 
young men go for visits or for work. In the Gulf, Malayali migrant 
young men seem to wear the same as their Kozhikode counterparts, 
since the branded global fashions available locally are far too expensive. 
As among women, migrants’ clothes are generally bought in bulk when 
vacationing in Kerala.
Young men’s styles then follow class and rural/urban divides, with 
the lower class and/or rural tending to adopt hyper fashion and louder 
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colors. While rural people used to visit Kozhikode for clothes shopping, 
now even branded fashion shops are available in smaller towns.
More so than among women, men’s clothes move in a very stratiﬁed 
market. There are two zones of Kozhikode selling big brand franchises 
(e.g. all-Indian Raymonds; Lee jeans; Van Heusen). Another area caters 
for a mix of big brands and cheaper brands. These zones have just one 
or two upmarket women’s boutiques among a lot of men’s shops. The 
cheap end of the fashion market moves fast and changes several times a 
year, while expensive fashion brands shift styles just once a year. 
While some reformist-inclined Muslim men claim that religious 
injunctions advise that one should not be openly fashionable, there is 
nonetheless a widespread ethic of enjoyment—evident in furnishing 
styles, house-building, wedding celebrations, food and clothes, and 
exempliﬁed in the concept of “making jolly” (Liechty 2002; Osella and 
Osella 2007). 
The problem of “what to wear” has been hotly debated by Malabar 
Muslims at least since the middle of the twentieth century. Reformist 
sympathizers often pointed out that while in the past “Muslims 
had shaven heads, skull caps and beards,” nowadays, “we turned it 
upside down: we keep our hair but we don’t have beards any more!” 
Contemporary critique is extended to those who continue to wear the 
markers of non-reformist Islam: men who wear skullcaps or the white 
mundu, talakettu (white turban), and have shaven heads and beards. 
The reformist critique of “traditional” Muslim styles of self-presentation 
has two dimensions. On the one hand, it argues that normative styles 
are just one of the means through which the orthodox establishment 
tries to maintain a hold on Muslims, upholding “traditions” that have 
no base in the Koran. On the other, it suggests that styles appropriate 
for religious scholars (the ulema) are not necessary for Muslim men 
at large, who must engage with and adapt to the complex demands of 
everyday life. In this reformist critique, the use by non-ulema men of 
beards and shaven heads (as among the unreformed Muslim population) 
contributes to the negative stereotyping of Muslims and is considered 
an index of a more generalized Muslim “backwardness”—a state of 
affairs in which the Muslim community is seen to continue to lag behind 
the more “developed” Kerala Hindu and Christians.
Conclusions
Indian and Kerala public discourse, and private fears expressed among 
many Hindus and Christians, criticize Muslims’ recent new veiling as: 
alien; Arabic; due to Gulf migration; and unnecessary. Here, De Jong 
(2005) is certainly correct in arguing against making such a sharp 
division between Muslim dress codes and those of other Indians. Hindu 
women in Kerala also generally ﬁnd sleeveless sari blouses and Western 
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dress decadent and immoral. It is certainly not the case that only Muslim 
women are constrained in their choice of clothing or preoccupied by 
the issues of modesty and femininity. The issue then becomes that of 
deﬁning what counts as decent, and it is here that different idioms of 
modesty come into play. Pardah, contrary to what is often assumed, is 
not new to Muslims in Kerala but was widely in use in the past. Most 
of today’s elderly (aged seventy plus) grandmothers have never gone out 
unveiled. What we are seeing is the rejection by women in their forties 
and ﬁfties of the dress codes they followed in their youth, while younger 
women also search for increasingly “decent dress.”
It is also not the case that only women are preoccupied with balancing 
fashion and decency. With increased knowledge and the conﬁdence 
engendered by the rise of reformist organizations like KNM, Koranic 
and pan-Islamic deﬁnitions of modesty for men and women alike are 
taking precedence over previously dominant local idioms, which as we 
have seen were never neutral. Overall, processes of reasoned debate 
about dress are guiding women towards better observance of pardah, at 
the same time as they are leading to shifts in men’s dress, which move 
them away from nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century customary 
“Muslim styles,” such as skullcaps and beards. As women become more 
easily distinguished, their men become less so.
Arab and Gulf inﬂuences—long-standing and reinvigorated rather 
than appearing ex nihilo post-1970s have certainly widened the 
repertoire of styles of decent dress available to Muslim women (Osella 
and Osella 2007). But these inﬂuences certainly do not, as anxious 
Hindu critics suggest, bring alien forms into Indian life. Young Muslim 
women with an eye for style are taking up the glamorous abaya, but 
young men are certainly not adopting either the thob (long robe) or the 
gold watches commonly used by Arab men. Indian Islamic reformism 
moves according to its own local logic and does not march to a Saudi (or 
Arab) beat (Osella and Osella 2008). The abaya is a status symbol and 
an index of youth, sophistication, and wealth; it must be understood as 
a sub-set of Indian pardah dress and not as the prototype.
To conclude, Muslim men and women alike are currently negotiating 
contemporary global and pan-Indian fashions within the requirements 
of a generalized modernist, populist, and vernacular orthopraxy that has 
been gradually discovered since the 1920s, and which is part of a general 
growing awareness of Islam, not so much as a customary communal 
identity but as a living faith which places demands on the individual 
believer (Huq 2008; Mahmood 2005; Mule and Barthel 1992; Robinson 
2004). And while men and women make extremely complex moves—
negotiating global and local trends—Muslim enjoyment of life continues 
to place a premium on fashion and the pleasures of dress, considered by 
most Muslims, including religious scholars, to be legitimate. 
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Notes
1. Localized communities have, since the nineteenth century, been 
drawn into the broad (but problematic) categories of “Hindu” and 
“Muslim” (see e.g. Gupta 2002).
2. We are transliterating from Malayalam according to local 
pronunciation and use, as pardah, rather than the more common (in 
the literature) purdah.
3. A University of Calicut survey suggests that across Kerala’s northern 
(Muslim-dominated) region, pardah increased from 3.5% in 1990 
to 32.5% by 2000 (cited in Basheer 2003). We observed in 2002–4 
around Calicut city a far higher percentage: perhaps around 50%, 
with 90% usage in the old Muslim area of the city, Thekkepuram.
4. Formerly known as Calicut. 
5. See Tarlo (1996) and Banerjee and Miller (2003) for discussions of 
how sari lengths, draping styles, blouses, and age of adoption shift 
across time and region.
6. Events indicating the aggression of the Hindu right include the 
destruction in 1992 of the Babri Masjid—a north Indian mosque 
at Ayodhya, which was destroyed by a Hindu mob while police and 
government ofﬁcials looked on; the 2002 massacre of Muslims in 
Gujarat, and communal violence in Marad (just outside Kozhikode), 
Kerala, in 2002 and 2003.
7. Rs 80 = £1 = US$2.
8. Taller than a skullcap and produced in north Malabar, the valatopi 
was the preferred headdress of urban Muslims.
9. Pre-Independence, trousers were worn almost exclusively by the most 
sophisticated and anglophile members of the middle class. In the 
1950s, trousers become fashionable ﬁrstly amongst college students, 
standing for India’s drive towards modernization and progress.
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